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Review of Judicial Decision-making in the




Article 78 of the first Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1954) directed that:
'The administration of justice by the People's Courts is only subject to the law'. As Brady
observed:
This judicial independence clause was not strictly observed, and Party Leaders
continued to 'advise' judges on sentences and procedure in cases of political
significance ... The party continued to play a major role in the selection of judges at
People's Congresses, and the four-year judges' term of office could be ended by the
Congress ... The mass line survived at least in the language of government directives
which cautioned judges to avoid a bureaucratic style which might separate them from
common people, and the Party still urged that political ideology and socialist
education be woven into court decisions and judicial argument.'
While the constitutional injunction to independence is general, specific legislative provi-
sions do not directly preclude the overall governance of the Party. In fact, the initial articles
of the 1982 Constitution celebrate the 'dignity of the socialist legal system' (Article 5), and
as the preamble confirms, the construction and maintenance of Chinese socialism remains
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Therefore it might be argued that the
protection of judicial power from the 'interference by administrative organs, public
organisations or individuals' (Article 126) does not envisage the intervention of the Party.
The political dominance over thejudiciary in the PRC took on destructive proportions during
the Anti-rightist Movements, and the period of Cultural Revolution.' From the late 1950s
until the death of Mao, the judicial system was attacked as revisionist and class biased.3 The
downgrading of the influence of formal legality was clearly demonstrated by the dramatic
reduction in its constitutional coverage. For example, in the 1954 Constitution there were
twelve articles which set out the workings of the judiciary. In the 1975 version only one such
article appeared. Provisions containing 'bourgeois concepts' of due process, equality before
Published in Asia Pacific Law Review, 1992, Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 75-94.
76 ASIA PACIFIC LAW REVIEW
the law, open trials, rights to a defence, and protections against arbitrary arrest, were
eliminated.'
Article 123 of the present Constitution stipulates that: 'The People's Courts of the PRC are
the judicial organ of the state' and in that respect exercise its judicial powers. The Law of
Criminal Procedure of the PRC (Article 3) designates the separate powers and responsibili-
ties of the principal agencies of criminal justice. Through exclusion, 'judicial powers' (in the
court's criminal jurisdiction) seem to be limited to adjudication in both first instance and
appellate review situations, and the passing of sentence. According to Article 128 of the
Constitution, the Courts are responsible for the exercise of judicial powers, to the National
People's Congress and its Standing Committee.
This essential integration of judicial power within the framework of government is
reinforced by the court's responsibility to the People's Congresses. Article 3 provides that:
'All administrative,judicial, and prosecutorial organs of the state are created by the People's
Congresses to which they are responsible, and under whose supervision they operate'. The
courts are, however, said to be expressly independent, and not subject to the interference of
the administrative and procuratorial arms of government or individuals.' The contradiction
inherent within such arrangements is a major concern for this paper.
Through a broad analysis of the procedures whereby a judge's decision can be reviewed in
the PRC, it is intended to expose the potential and extant forces at work on the exercise of
judicial discretion within the Chinese justice process.
For example, whatever its functional significance for 'socialist legality', judicial independ-
ence is unlikely to progress beyond constitutional discourse in a system of government
which does not aspire after a separation of powers.6 Such separation of powers is expressly
provided for within the Constitution, and the organic and procedural laws. Remembering,
however, that modern Chinese legality has relied on civil rather than common law sources,
the conceptualisation of 'independence' for Chinese lawyers and legislators may be one of
responsibility to government through accountability for the individual exercise of judicial
power.7
The dilemma for judicial independence in China may be compounded by the contentious
assumption that discretionary decision-making remains a responsibility for most sentencing
functionaries, whether legally trained, judicially empowered, or otherwise. In order to
appreciate the actual dynamics of judicial discretion in China it becomes necessary to
critically analyse the political utility of judicial hierarchies, appeal mechanisms, and case
review facilities.
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I. Influences on Judicial Decision-making in China
General Judicial Administration
The Organic Law of the People's Courts (as well as of the People's Procuratorates)
substantially recreated a system of judicial administration which originated from the
relevant Organic Laws in 1954. Broadly, the system in 1978, with minor modifications, also
relied on public trials, the right to a defence, people's assessors, adjudication committees,
and the two-trial (one appeal) system. 'One significant change in the revised court law is to
make the court accountable only to the people's congresses and free the court from direct
supervision by local governments'.' Articles 35 and 36 of the Organic Law of the People's
Courts (1979) provide that the presidents of the people's courts are elected and recalled by
the corresponding people's congresses, and their vice presidents and judges are appointed
and dismissed by the standing committees of these congresses.
This selection process, and the structure to which it leads, makes China somewhat different
from other socialist legality models.9 For example, assistant judges, rare as they are in other
systems, are appointed to support the judge in his work, and in some instances may
temporarily serve as judges. They are appointed and removed by their respective judicial
committee (Article 37 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts).
Review through Court Hierarchies
The Organic Law of the People's Courts introduced a four-tiered structure'0 which generally
services two strata of administration. The Local People's Courts are convened at basic,
intermediate, and higher levels. The Supreme People's Courts are part of the central
government beyond the Provinces.
After mediation or conciliation has failed, matters may be presented at any level for judicial
deliberation" depending on their perceived degree of seriousness, or of general importance.
Although courts in the PRC do not operate under the strict domination of precedent, past
determinations of law and penalty may influence the minds of the court at first instance:
The Higher People's Courts have an enlarged appellate jurisdiction, and operate, like
the lower two courts, in provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. The
Supreme People's Court hears appeals ...The Supreme People's Court has the duty to
interpret laws. 12
It would appear to be the case in the PRC that either the prosecutorial organs or the citizen
parties to an action can seek review at a higher judicial level. The outcome of the matter may
be the subject of appeal either in terms of penalty, or mistake. A higher court may also, on
its own initiative, seek to review the decision of an inferior tribunal. 3
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Under the two-trial system as stipulated in Article 12 of the Organic Law of the
People's Courts, ajudicial ruling of the court of first instance may be appealed to the
court of the next highest level ... In the past, the fear of incurring heavier punishment
seriously deterred the Chinese from exercising their right of appeal. To remedy the
situation, Article 137 of the Criminal Procedure Law specifically provides that in its
judgement of a case based on appeal by the accused or his advocate, the court of
second instance is not allowed to aggravate the original punishment. 4
A legally effective judgement in the PRC can be subject to 'judicial supervision' if some
definite error in the determination of the facts or application of the law is found (see article
149 of the Criminal Procedure Law).
The Annual Report of the President of the Supreme People's Court, delivered at the First
Session of the National People's Congress (NPC) (1st April 1988), provides some details of
the judicial appeal process from the sentencer's perspective. 5 Appeals or review can be
initiated by a citizen through letters of complaint to a superior court, or through the regular
supervisory function of the Supreme Court. In relation to the latter, the president remarked:
We use a method of 'examining the Oracles' to assess the quality of trial cases. Each
year we send out a third of our judicial personnel to sit together with lower courts, and
randomly select cases and types of case for review in co-operation with the instant
court. If errors are found they are altered accordingly.
As reported by the President of the Supreme Court, to the 7th NPC Meeting in April 1989,
the Ministry of Justice had formulated guidelines for the operation of this one-third 'spot
check' system. 6
This level of judicial review is supported by the examination and approval system, being as
it is the province of a court president or the chief judicial officer.
The more informal and individualised process of review has been criticised 7 for compro-
mising the authority of the president over his bench, challenging the finality of a verdict,
challenging competence and independence, and running against the concept of 'democratic
centralism' (see, Constitution of the PRC 1982, Article 3).
Article 149 of the Criminal Procedure Law links judicial oversight with the workings of
appointed adjudication committees. If the presidents of the people's courts at various levels
discover that the determination of facts or the application of the law in judgments of their
courts which have become legally effective, contain actual error, they must send the case to
the adjudication committee 'to be handled'. The Supreme People's Court, and Procuratorate
have authority to bring up any decision of the lower courts which contains 'actual error', for
review, rehearing, direction for rehearing, or 'protest'.
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In cases where a sentence of capital punishment has been the result, there exist special review
procedures. Article 43 of the Criminal Law of the PRC stipulates that except for those capital
sentences imposed by the Supreme People's Court all other death sentences should be
submitted to it for review.
A new collegiate panel shall be formed for the new adjudication of the people's courts in
accordance with the procedure of adjudication supervision (see, Part V of the Criminal
Procedure Law of the PRC).
Courts and the Judiciary
At the level of ideology in China, there can be no separation of state power because, as
guiding principles behind the Criminal Law and of the Law of Criminal Procedure identify
(Articles 1), the law is intended to protect the 'people's democratic dictatorship, led by the
people and based on the worker/peasant alliance'. The state then is conceived of as the
embodiment of the will of the proletariat, and all its administrative forms are
subservient to it.
The National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power and both by
definition and through the provisions of the Constitution, and the Organic Law of the
People's Courts, the judiciary must be subordinate to it. The President of the Supreme
People's Court represents all court levels in carrying out their reporting responsibilities to
the NPC.
Proponents of the view that the courts and the judiciary must exercise their power subject
to designated levels of examination and approval, see the people's court as youji zengti (an
organic whole). Under this view,judicial independence does not attach to individual judicial
officers, but to the people's court as a whole. 8 The court as a whole might be independent
from outside influence, but internally it is subject to the principle of majority decisions,
hierarchical precedent, individual subservience to the organisation, and local courts to the
central court.'9 Since each individual bench is only one link in the organic whole, its decision
does not have legal effect until it is approved either by the president or the chief judicial
officer, and/or thejudicial committee, and goes out under the official court seal. These levels
of approval obviously have an important impact on the status of the accused who cannot
participate in their preceding deliberations.
It has been argued that it is the people's courts rather than the judiciary in China which are
pronounced independent:
Therefore the approval of the court is necessary to effectuate the judgements
rendered. When a collegiate bench tries a case the decision that it renders is only
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preliminary in nature. This is because the people's court must sanction all its
decisions before they may become final. 20
In this respect the individual institutions of judicial power are viewed as above influence,
beyond the mechanisms of internal approval. Those individuals charged with the exercise
of such power must do so responsibly, and be accountable to those who might later approve
their decision.
Courts and the Party
It is generally accepted amongst critical 'China watchers' that the People's Congresses have
no real power, and because actual authority resides within the Party, for the purpose of
analysing independence one must examine the relationship between the Party and the
judiciary. 21 This is made all the more significant when one appreciates the interconnections
between the state and Party Constitutions in China.22
Although on paper the judiciary was formally distinct from other state organisations
and the Party, in practice it remained essentially undifferentiated from the adminis-
trative apparatus of the state. The Party with its tools of mobilisation, the voluntaristic
mass movements spearheaded by party members and 'activists', dominated the
judiciary as well as other state hierarchies.23
Lubman further asserts that courts of law under the Communist Party in the PRC, 'have been
seen and used as active participants in the implementation of Party and state policies'. For
example, it is common to hear publicly broadcast in China the principal current policy goals
with which the courts are charged by their political masters.
The articulation of short term goals for the courts is nothing new in the People's
Republic of China; it has been a characteristic of law administration since 1949.
However the technique raises obvious questions about the independence of the
courts. Not only is the allocation of scarce judicial resources effected, but more
importantly the courts can expect to be evaluated by higher authorities on the basis
of their responsiveness to demands to meet short term goals.24
The theme of socialist legality gained strength following the Cultural Revolution, as
evidenced through its inclusion in the language of the most recent Constitution. Article 5 of
that instrument sets down that no organisation or individual may be elevated above the
Constitution and the law is limited to a contrast with individual citizens, and their
organisations. As for the Party, the omnipotence of its policy as the prime basis of all state-
centred decision-making is manifest both in theory and practice.
Even after the celebration of legality in the 1956 Constitution, senior representatives of the
legal profession extolled the virtues of Party involvement.
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For example, in 1958 the Deputy Chairman of the China Politics and Legal Affairs Society
observed:
The rightists have said that the Party is a 'layman' on legal matters and that as such
should not head legal works. This is absurd. In China the legal system has been
created under the leadership of the Communist Party, in accordance with the
principles of Marxist-Leninism and the experience of the people themselves in the
course of class struggle.... The rightists have accused the Party of interfering with the
trial work of the court. This is likewise absurd. We all know that the laws have to be
administered according to the policies of the state, and it is the Communist Party
which is most capable of deciding such policies in the interests of all the people. The
Party does not interfere with the court's independent trial as long as they adhere to
the policies of the state. Is there anything wrong with such leadership and supervi-
sion?
25
Kim refers to the position put abroad in the Chinese press prior to the 1978 Constitution that
the leadership of the Communist Party are guardians of socialist legality:
The Party's role in dealing with the judiciary is threefold. First, the Party conducts
education programmes to ensure its ideology and the maintenance of the Party line
by the judiciary. Second, the Party selects a number of able cadres to run the judicial
organs. Third, the Party constantly supervises whether or not the judicial organs
strictly execute the law. Thus, the Party becomes the guardian of the law.
26
Koguchi cites those types of cases which, at least as late as 1979 (and in practice, beyond
that date), had to be submitted to Party committees for examination and approval.27 These
included cases involving the death penalty, and those dealing with crimes committed by
foreigners. At this point of the development of socialist legality it was for the Supreme
People's Court to hear and ratify capital cases, but the actual power of sentencing a criminal
to death is still in the hands of the Party Central Committee.
28
The system of direct examination and approval of law cases by the Party was abolished
through an instruction of the Central Committee. 29 The instruction required firstly that the
courts properly handle cases within the Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure,
and fully correct all thoughts and customs that contradict these laws. Second, the Party was
to intensify its leadership over the judiciary, and make sure that the judicial function is
exercised in accordance with the Constitution and the laws. Third, the Party must quickly
re-establish the judicial organs at all levels, and reconstruct a contingent of judicial
operatives. Fourth, the Party must broadly and profoundly propagate the laws and prepare
for the full implementation of the new criminal codes. Finally, the Party organisation at all
levels must set the example in full observation of the laws.
This instruction specified that the Party leadership of the judiciary is limited to that of
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guidance and policy. Observers have it that the instruction was honoured more in the
breach.3" Perhaps as a result, somejudicial officers appeared reluctant to exercise their duties
in any independent fashion. Judicial autonomy was also impeded by the inexperience and
lack of adequate legal training possessed by some judges, and the gross inadequacy of their
resourcing. Added to this was the widespread inability of the courts to adjudicate a great
range of problems due to the low level of power and prestige of the judiciary both within and
without the bureaucracy.
Since 1981 opinions defending the system of examination and approval by the Party have
once again emerged. As early as 1980 the People's Daily asserted that the intervention of
the Party committee was essential for handling important or complicated cases.31 Even the
then President of the Supreme People's Court, Jiang Hua, who personally opposed Party
intervention, acknowledged its importance. His compromise position was that the courts
should voluntarily seek the advice and instruction of the Party committee, or submit reports
to it, on the Third National Working Conference on Criminal Justice, in which these matters
were canvassed. A commentator observed:
Does the Party committee have the authority to handle individual cases? Of course
it has. In practice, the Party committee must intervene whenever that committee finds
the case to be important and difficult or to have socially far-reaching implications ....
When serious conflicts arise as to factfinding or the application of the law among the
police, the procuratorate, and the court, (the latter) should strive for an agreement
amongst those by asking for instructions from the Party.32
Leng identifies the following as the problems to the system of direct Party interference with
court determinations:
33
(i) it is impossible for a Party committee (or its political-legal secretary) to
investigate all cases, and to do so would cause unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice, or the making of careless and erroneous decisions;
(ii) the Party committee's direct involvement in concrete court cases tended to
weaken the spirit of enthusiasm of judicial personnel in their work;
(iii) this had the effect of rendering court trials a mere formality, causing the
community to lose confidence in the PRC's legal system.
This last issue assumes that such confidence was either likely or possible, and that to some
extent the independence of the courts was instrumental for its generation and maintenance.
This is difficult to establish with any historical or cultural certainty in China.
Open Court
One Chinese writer maintains that the public trial not only serves a broad community
education function, but it also puts adjudication under the supervision of the people. 4
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Assertions such as this rely on some fundamental assumptions, the simplest of which is that
public trials will occur with sufficient frequency to allow for the achievement of any such
purpose.
Public trials are not held in China unless the court is convinced, on the basis of the pre-trial
evidence, that the facts will be proven in such a forum. If there is a doubt about the
defendant's guilt, an open trial will not usually take place.
If a case is publicly in progress, and inconsistencies arise in the prosecution, the trial will
usually be adjourned for investigations and hearings to continue in private. The function of
a public trial in China is to demonstrate guilt and contrition rather than to view the contest
over innocence." It is also not seen as an essential opportunity for the community to
scrutinise the workings of the judiciary and the people's court process.
Lay Assessors
Among those features of popular legality which were revived from the 1954 Constitution by
its 1978 successor was the participation of the people's assessors in the public administration
of justice (see Article 41).
Except for minor cases, trials arc conducted in cases of original jurisdiction by a collegiate
bench of ajudge and two assessors. Lay participation is not a feature of the collegiate benches
in appeal courts.
Article 9 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts sets down the procedure for the election
of lay assessors. The franchise attempts to emphasise local knowledge or, in certain
situations, particular expertise which might assist in the resolution of special issues.
Lay members of the bench enjoy equal judicial power as that possessed by the professional
judges (Article 38). In this regard the inquisitorial and decision-making processes have a
potential to be truly collegiate. And despite the fact that lay participation does not extend to
appeals, the assessors may have a real influence over deliberations at first-instance trials.
Such influence may be more significant than expected by those with experience of a more
professionalised judiciary. In China there remains a considerable proportion of judges
without formal or sophisticated legal training. Also the division between lay assessors and
the judicial elite will be less marked in China, when one appreciates the relatively modest
social status of judges and lawyers.
This is another opportunity in theory for the community to participate in the formal
process of justice at all levels in the PRC. It strives to provide a bridge between the
people and the courts, where bias should be less likely and the assessors are in a
position to educate their constituency about the working of the justice process.36
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The Judicial (Adjudication) Committees
As part of the selection process of higher judges and judicial officers, the president of the
respective courts consults with Judicial Committees (zhengfa weiyuanhui) which are bodies
set up at each judicial level and consist of the president and vice president of the court, the
local Party secretary, and other responsible Party members. This formalisation of influence
for Party officials goes to further nullify the effect of the Central Committee's Instruction
against examination and approval.
These judicial committees have grown to become highly influential as review mechanisms,
far beyond the limit of judicial appointments.
It is known that where a court encounters problems, judges will, rather than seek
advice or (sic) remit the case to the court of a higher jurisdiction, simply consult the
Judicial Committee, which may decide to hear the case itself.3 7
Some commentators do not go so far as to represent these committees as having any original
jurisdiction, but there is agreement on their appellate and review significance.
These adjudication committees have responsibility for matters which might come
before their particular court. Prior to trial for example they may consider those cases
of some importance to the area, or which are of doubtful merit. They may recommend
that important matters be referred to a higher court."
Judicial Committees also play a pre-appellate role in that they will often be called
upon to mediate following a decision made by a court against which a procuratorate
or public security bureau may wish to appeal.39
Caldwell suggests that these committees are merely the modem-day incarnation of 'trial by
Party Secretary' (shuji-pian).1 This is perhaps unduly cynical in that the role of the
committees is formally limited by legislation to specified areas of advice, consultation and
review. Article 1 1 of the Organic Law of the People's Courts gives them the less sinister
purpose to 'sum upjudicial experience, and to discuss major or difficult cases as well as other
issues regarding judicial work'. This is consistent with the interdependence of Chinese
socialist legality as suggested in Article 17; 'the judicial executive work of various levels
shall be administered by the judicial executive organs'.
Under the Criminal Procedure Law the functions of the adjudication committees are thus
specified:
(i) to decide whether or not to disqualify the chiefjudge if he is challenged by the
parties to the matter or their representatives on the grounds of a personal
interest in the case;
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(ii) to discuss and decide upon all difficult cases which are referred by the
president of the people's court. The collegiate bench is to execute the
decisions of the adjudication committee;
(iii) if definite errors are found by the presidents of the people's courts in the
determination of the facts or the application of the law in decisions of their
courts, they are to submit the determinations to the committee for its final
disposition.
In these respects judges are not guaranteed independence in their case-by-case exercise of
discretionary decision-making in that they may be usurped by the collective decision of a
committee which may not have been involved in the actual trial.
Review Function of the Procuratorates
In the legal system of the PRC the people's procuratorates are much more than simply the
prosecutorial organ. Article 1 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates defines
these agencies as 'organs of the State supervising the administration of justice' and as such
are empowered to 'carry out investigations of criminal process, institute prosecutions,
scrutinise the trial activities of the courts, and supervise the execution of judgements and the
activities of correctional institutions' (Article 5).
In an administrative sense within the wider government of the PRC, the procuratorates may
not possess the keenest review potential in that they are responsible both vertically and
horizontally to their respective local level governments and the hierarchy of their own
organisation (see Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates (1979), Article 10). In
addition they no longer possess a general power to oversee the legality of all state organs.
Article 9 of the Organic Law, however, recites the independence of the procuratorate 'in
accordance with the law, and shall not be subject to interference by other administrative
organs, organisations or individuals'.
Along with their wider investigative role, the procuratorates have a responsibility to activate
the review ofjudicial decision-making. As suggested in Article 14 of the Organic Law of the
People's Courts, this is more significant than a prosecutor's right to initiate an appeal against
sentence:
... If the Supreme People's Procuratorate finds some definite error in a legally
effective judgement or order of the people's courts at any level, or if the people's
procuratorate at a higher level finds such error in a legally effective judgement or
order of any people's court at a lower level it has the authority to lodge a protest in
accordance with the procedure of judicial supervision.
This final phrase provides for a very wide scope of review. The 'protest' might be lodged
with a higher people's court (should one be appropriately available) or with the relevant
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judicial committee. Further, the procuratorate could work through its own administrative
hierarchy, up to the Ministry of Justice and on to the appropriate Standing Committee of the
NPC.
The Internal Judicial Committee
The Internal Judicial Committee is the seventh Special Committee of the State Council and
has been given a variety of legislative and procedural review responsibilities. These include:
(i) Receiving for examination and assessment, motions to be placed before the
Standing Committee, concerning legislative enactment
(ii) Drafting laws on social order and citizen protection
(iii) Suggesting revisions of criminal penalties and punishment
(iv) Proposing policy initiatives on socio-legal concerns such as corruption, youth
safety, prostitution.
The committee has the oversight of any amendments to go before the Standing Committee
of the NPC regarding the Courts and judicial practice.
As a sub-committee of the NPC Standing Committee, it is unlikely that the judicial
committee could receive reports directly from the President of the Supreme People's Court.
This reporting obligation, as referred to in legislation, would not be subject to delegation
either from the perspective of the nominated judicial official, nor from the NPC and its
executive.
Ill. The Reality of Judicial Decision-making in China
Unlike the Anglo-American model in which courts are theoretically impartial
agencies for adjudicating conflicts, Chinese courts under the Communist Party have
been seen and used as active participants in the implementation of Party and state
policies. As in other Chinese governmental activities, it has long been common to
announce publicly the principal current policy goals which the court should aim to
realise, and to link their work with implementing those policies.4
An example of the public policy utility of the people's courts was the recourse had to legal
form in ending the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. The trial of the 'gang of four'
powerfully represented a political propitiation. It is significant that a court (special as it was)
formed the mechanism for such an important political transition. More significant perhaps
was the application of the trial process to an apparently political resolution. This trend has
continued across the recent development of judicial adjudication in China. 2
REVIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-AN OVERVIEW OF UNIQUE DEVELOPMENTS 87
The use of the courts to review political challenge and dissent, rather than to rely on the
activation of the 'mass line',reflects an appreciation by the state of the legitimation potential
of legality. The Chinese leadership since the days of Mao, in a symbolic sense at least, has
turned away from the promotion of popular violence in favour of the more formalised and
predictable controls offered by the courts. In the course of this transition the prestige of the
courts may have been raised. Also, through such state recognition, the language and
institutions of trial-centred legality became a recognised option within the state's control
agenda. For instance, the prompt use of the people's courts (and their military counterparts)
to substantiate claims of a return to normality after the Tiananmen violence in 1989, confirms
the acceptance by Chinese officials that, at least in their dealings with the international
community, the imprimatur of the judicial process raises tangible evidence of democratic
government.43
It is no coincidence that this reactivation of the courts occurred at a time when Chinese
legislatures were implementing codes of criminal law and procedure. In addition the
atmosphere of legalism was structured around a discourse of constitutional rights and
responsibilities.'
Having said this, the position of the courts in translating this new legality is openly
circumscribed in political terms. The role of the courts, and more particularly that of the
judiciary, in meeting the standards set by these new laws, is still viewed in terms of a revised
notion of 'correct' politics.
For example, the courts have been enlisted to 'deal with' social problems which have been
endemic traditionally in Chinese commercial and administrative relations,45 as well as the
growing adverse consequences of a centralised economy in transition.
Reports of decisions by the courts in cases involving conduct of the type discussed
in the (Party) 'circular' not surprisingly proliferated soon after it was promulgated.
There had been no shortage of reports of such cases before the State Council directive,
presumably reflecting the growing concern which lead to that high level expression.
More reports appeared around the time of the circular .... 46
One can speculate on the direction of influence between political pronouncement and case
law, but there can be little doubt about the significance of their interrelationship in the PRC.
The connection between judicial decision-making and the direction of politics in the PRC
has always been obvious. For example, when the Chinese leadership was endeavouring to
reconstruct the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, thejudges played their part. As reported
by Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People's Court, by the end of June 1980, the people's
courts at various levels had reviewed over 1.13 million criminal convictions handed down
during the Cultural Revolution, and had redressed more than 251,000 cases in which people
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were 'unjustly, falsely and wrongly charged and sentenced.'47 Remembering the extreme
limitations on the newly rehabilitated judiciary, one might suspect that a review process of
this relative magnitude was more politically motivated and productive than it was an active
and actual pursuit of individualised judicial re-examination.
IV. Judicial Discretion and the Institutional Boundaries of
Justice in the PRC
Professor Tay observes that within the present world climate of socialist reorganisation
China will have to substantially modify, and to some extent create its legal culture afresh in
the face of both internal and external pressures for more a more complex and professional
legality. 8 This is made difficult to realise not only because of the historical aversion in
Chinese culture and politics to the supremacy of formal legality, 9 but also it is due to the
conflation of arms of administration for the advancement of centralised control.
Such complications are well evidenced in the recent struggle to regenerate the institutions
of justice which might do more than symbolise constitutional legality. This focus on the
judiciary as part of the latest period of institution-building in China provides an insight into
the conflicting values which the legal system embodies, within the tangled imperatives of
Chinese modernisation.
It is the close connection between the courts and campaigns for social mobilisation which
has tended to give the judiciary a somewhat compromised appearance. This may stand as less
of a problem inside Chinese administration than it may be perceived by those from bourgeois
legal traditions. Even so, 'campaigns also may tend to infect the legal system with precisely
the kind of unevenness in the rhythms of bureaucratic and political life that law is supposed
to reduce.' 50
This will eventually pose problems when the connection between the bureaucracies of
politics and justice operate with fundamental and public institutional connection. The
tradition within the PRC of substituting Party policy and personal views for legal
determinations, reveals the tenuous status of judicial discretion.
Associated with this are thejudicial review, and the review of thejudiciary. As to the former,
the re-establishment of a formalised justice bureaucracy in China raises the issue of the
extent to which the law should reach out to punish officials who previously may only have
been open to the administrative sanction of either government or the Party. If Law is to
support bureaucratic discipline and defend social order, then its primacy needs to be
manifested through vital functionaries such as the judge.
Two important questions arise out of the foregoing analysis of court review procedures in
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China. First, what is the actual significance of judicial decision-making for the administra-
tion of justice within the PRC justice system? Second, assuming that judges do have an
important deliberative function, what are the consequences of the varied influences
previously identified for the exercise of judicial discretion?
The latter issue must be addressed from an appreciation of Chinese 'socialist legality'. This
ideology has developed through endeavours to reconcile a principle of independent courts
and individualised judicial discretion with the reality of Party supremacy. The Chinese
administration holds that insofar as their judicial system operates within a framework of
Party leadership, it would be wrong to equate the socialist principle of 'independent judicial
power' with a separation of powers, or judicial independence as proclaimed by the
bourgeoisie."' Equally mistaken from their perspective is to interpret Party leadership as a
substitute for the decision-making responsibilities of judicial organs.
Moreover they stress the fact that insistence on the principle of 'administering justice
independently according to the law' (Article 4 of the Organic Law of the People's
Court) is consistent with strengthening the Party leadership in legal work. 2
Unfortunately from the voice of the 'official account' the contradictions apparent in such a
position remain unanswered beyond statements of faith. Those who will be immediately
aware of the limitations necessitated by such posturing are those justice operatives who
would claim the power to make individual decisions.
Associate Professor and Director, Institute of Criminology, Law School,
University of Sydney.
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